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Financial Stability and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: 
Lessons from Chile and Malaysia 
 





There is growing recognition that nations may need to deploy cross-border financial regulations 
to prevent and mitigate financial crises.  Indeed, in December of 2012 the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) agreed on a new ‘institutional view’ that notes how the IMF will begin to recommend 
that nations deploy cross-border financial regulations going forward.  However, many nations 
have become party to global, regional, and bi-lateral trade and investment treaties that may 
restrict their ability to effectively deploy such regulations.   
This paper examines the cases of two countries currently in negotiations for a Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (TPP): Chile and Malaysia.  The paper examines the extent to which each 
nation has deployed cross-border financial regulations in the past, and the extent to which they 
have negotiated the policy space for such regulations in its previous trade and investment treaties.  
Finally, it analyzes the extent to which such measures would be permitted if the TPP’s investment 
provisions looked like the model bi-lateral investment treaty of the United States.   
We find that, with some important exceptions, both countries have successfully deployed cross-
border financial regulations and have carved out the ability to do so under a sample of 
representative trading commitments.  However, such policy space would be jeopardized if the 
TPP conformed to the US model rather than arrangements that each country has been able to 
broker in other arenas.   
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I. Introduction 
 
In the wake of the global financial crisis the regulation of cross-border finance has become 
justified now more than ever.  New advances in econometrics has found that capital account 
liberalization is not strongly associated with growth in emerging markets and developing countries 
yet tends to be associated with financial crises. New theory sees financial markets as imperfect, 
thus requiring second-best Pigouvian taxes to correct those market failures. 2  Moreover, the bulk 
of econometric evidence also shows that taxes and other measures on capital flows tend to be 
effective in meeting their stated goals.  Indeed, in the wake of the crisis the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) found that those nations that regulated the inflow and outflow of capital 
were among the least hard hit from the crisis.3  Perhaps even more notable is the fact that the 
IMF officially changed its view on capital account liberalization and the management of capital 
flows in 2012.  Moving forward, the IMF will recommend that nations put in place capital 
account regulations under a number of circumstances.4 
In the midst of this change, a number of countries are concerned that they may have taken on 
commitments in the trading regime that may not permit them to regulate cross-border finance.  
The legal and policy literature thus far confirms those concerns.  Under the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) nations are not permitted to regulate cross-border finance if they have 
made commitments in financial services under the General Agreement in Trade in Services 
(GATS).  However, there may be recourse under various WTO exceptions.  For many Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Bi-lateral Investment Treaties (BITs) with the United States 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Jeanne,	  Olivier,	  Arvind	  Subramanian	  John	  Williamson	  (2012),	  Who	  Needs	  an	  Open	  Capital	  Account?	  
Washington:	  Peterson	  Institute	  for	  International	  Economics.	  
3	  Ostry	  et	  al,	  (2010),	  “Managing	  Capital	  Inflows-­‐The	  Role	  of	  Controls”	  IMF	  Staff	  Position	  Note,	  
Washington,	  IMF.	  
4	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (2012),	  Institutional	  View	  on	  Capital	  Account	  Liberalization	  and	  the	  
Management	  of	  Capital	  Flows,	  	  Washington	  DC,	  International	  Monetary	  Fund.	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however, all forms of capital must flow ‘freely and without delay’ among trading partners and 
such treaties have a generally more limited set of exceptions.   
The paper is organized into four additional parts.  Part II provides background on the 
relationship between trade treaties and capital account regulations (CARs). Part III provides our 
Chile analysis.  Part IV is the analysis of Malaysia.  Part V summarizes our findings and draws 
lessons for the TPP negotiations. 
 
II. Background on CARs and the Trading System 
Although the WTO requires a more limited opening of the capital account and may have a 
broader level of safeguards, there are a number of concerns about the ability of nation states to 
deploy CARs while maintaining their commitments under the GATS.  Members liberalize each 
sector along four modes.  Liberalization in mode one and three in financial services is the most 
relevant for capital flows because GATS members must liberalize financial flows that are 
connected to a service provided. 5  Mode one is cross-border supply, which stipulates the extent to 
which non-resident providers can supply services within the member's borders.  Mode three refers 
to commercial presence, or the ability of foreign service providers to have a commercial presence 
in a member's territory, such as a branch, agency, or subsidiary.6  Under the WTO, when nations 
choose to liberalize financial services--either through what is called ‘Mode 1’ trade in financial 
services or ‘Mode 3’ establishing a commercial presence (FDI) for financial service providers 
under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)—they do have to open their capital 
account in order for those services to contract.  US FTAs and BITs, in contrast, require free 
transfers associated with all covered investments, which are defined broadly. This obligation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5Ibid., 216. 
6“Guide to Reading the GATS Schedules of Specific Commitments and the List of Aricle II (MFN) 
Exemptions, World Trade Oranization, accessed at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/guide1_e.htm 10 May 2012. 
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requires – in effect – a full opening of the capital account among parties to the agreement.  Under 
the GATS if a nation makes commitments under Mode 1 they are required to open the capital 
account to allow those services to transact and are not permitted to regulate capital flows.  
Second, it is not clear that the GATS safeguards give ample room for nations to deploy CARs. 
 If a nation does not make any GATS commitments in Modes 1 or 3 of course they are 
free to regulate cross border finance as they see appropriate.  If a nation does list Mode 1 or Mode 
3 commitments, some degree of capital account liberalization is required.  The IMF notes the 
following:   
WTO members must allow cross-border (inward and outward) movements of capital if 
these are an essential part of a service for which they have made liberalization 
commitments regarding its cross-border supply (without establishment). For example, 
international capital transactions are an integral part of accepting deposits from or 
making loans to nonresidents (mode 1). International capital transactions are also usually 
associated with financial services such as securities trading on behalf of a customer 
residing in another country. The establishment of a commercial presence (mode 3) in a 
host country by a foreign services supplier involves both trade in services and 
international capital transactions. In permitting the establishment of a commercial 
presence, WTO members must allow inward (but not outward) capital transfers related to 
the supply of the service committed.7 
However, the GATS has three safeguard provisions that may allow nations to derogate from their 
commitments.  The most relevant components of each safeguard are displayed in Box 1. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (2010),	  Reference	  Note	  on	  Trade	  in	  Financial	  Services,	  Washington,	  
International	  Monetary	  Fund.	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BOX	  1:	  	  Key	  Safeguards	  Relevant	  to	  CARS	  
GATS	  Article	  XII:	  Restrictions	  to	  Safeguard	  the	  Balance	  of	  Payments	  
1.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  the	  event	  of	  serious	  balance-­‐of-­‐payments	  and	  external	  financial	  difficulties	  or	  threat	  thereof,	  a	  
Member	  may	  adopt	  or	  maintain	  restrictions	  on	  trade	  in	  services	  on	  which	  it	  has	  undertaken	  specific	  
commitments,	  including	  on	  payments	  or	  transfers	  for	  transactions	  related	  to	  such	  commitments.	  It	  is	  
recognized	  that	  particular	  pressures	  on	  the	  balance	  of	  payments	  of	  a	  Member	  in	  the	  process	  of	  economic	  
development	  or	  economic	  transition	  may	  necessitate	  the	  use	  of	  restrictions	  to	  ensure,	  inter	  alia,	  the	  
maintenance	  of	  a	  level	  of	  financial	  reserves	  adequate	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  its	  programme	  of	  economic	  
development	  or	  economic	  transition.	  
2.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  restrictions	  referred	  to	  in	  paragraph	  1:	  
(a)	  	  	  	  	  	  shall	  not	  discriminate	  among	  Members;	  	  	  
(b)	  	  	  	  	  	  shall	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  of	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund;	  	  	  
(c)	  	  	  	  	  	  shall	  avoid	  unnecessary	  damage	  to	  the	  commercial,	  economic	  and	  financial	  interests	  of	  any	  
other	  Member;	  	  	  
(d)	  	  	  	  	  	  shall	  not	  exceed	  those	  necessary	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  circumstances	  described	  in	  paragraph	  1;	  	  	  
(e)	  	  	  	  	  	  shall	  be	  temporary	  and	  be	  phased	  out	  progressively	  as	  the	  situation	  specified	  in	  paragraph	  1	  
improves.	  
3.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  determining	  the	  incidence	  of	  such	  restrictions,	  Members	  may	  give	  priority	  to	  the	  supply	  of	  services	  
which	  are	  more	  essential	  to	  their	  economic	  or	  development	  programs.	  However,	  such	  restrictions	  shall	  not	  be	  
adopted	  or	  maintained	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  protecting	  a	  particular	  service	  sector.	  
	  
Article	  2(a)	  of	  the	  Financial	  Services	  Agreement	  
2.	  Domestic	  Regulation	  
(a)	  Notwithstanding	  any	  other	  provisions	  of	  the	  Agreement,	  a	  Member	  shall	  not	  be	  prevented	  from	  taking	  
measures	  for	  prudential	  reasons,	  including	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  investors,	  depositors,	  policy	  holders	  or	  persons	  
to	  whom	  a	  fiduciary	  duty	  is	  owed	  by	  a	  financial	  service	  supplier,	  or	  to	  ensure	  the	  integrity	  and	  stability	  of	  the	  
financial	  system.	  Where	  such	  measures	  do	  not	  conform	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Agreement,	  they	  shall	  not	  be	  
used	  as	  a	  means	  of	  avoiding	  the	  Member's	  commitments	  or	  obligations	  under	  the	  Agreement.	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There are many concerns in the legal literature about the balance-of-payments 
exception.8 (see Viterbo, 2012).  It may be that the GATs balance of payments safeguard does not 
adequately guarantee that nations can use measures to regulate both the inflow and outflow of 
capital because there is no reference to derogations to maintain ‘financial stability’.  Moreover, 
2(c) in the balance of payments exception states that measures ‘shall not exceed those necessary’ 
to deal with the circumstances that a measure is trying to prevent or mitigate (see Box 1).  This 
amounts to what is called in WTO law as a ‘necessity test’ and could give a dispute panel 
authority to rule that an alternative measure could have been used.  Furthermore, there is 
concern over 2(e).  Requiring that measures be ‘temporary’ may not give nations ample time to 
meet their stated goals. 
 The GATS also has a provision often referred to as the ¨prudential carve-out¨ (Article 2(a) 
of the Financial Services Agreement).  This exception allows members to deviate from their 
commitments ‘for prudential reasons’ to ensure the protection of investors or to ‘ensure the 
integrity of and stability of its financial system.’  The GATS adds that if the prudential measures 
deviate from a nation´s GATS commitments “they shall not be used as a means of avoiding the 
Contracting Party´s commitments or obligations under the Agreement.¨  There are concerns in 
the legal literature that ´prudential reasons,’ while not defined, may not cover CARs and that the 
sentence stating that prudential measures should not breach a party´s commitments could be seen 
as ´self-cancelling.’ 
 It should be stressed that there has not been a case where this language has been tested 
with respect to CARs.  Some members gather that existing language will be sufficient.  Indeed, 
Ecuador is leading an effort to clarify the extent to which nations looking to re-regulate their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Viterbo,	  Anna	  Maria	  (2012),	  International	  Economic	  Law	  And	  Monetary	  Measures,	  Limitations	  to	  States’	  
Sovereignty	  and	  Dispute	  Settlement,	  London:	  Edward	  Elgar.	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financial systems can do so under the ‘cover’ of these safeguards.  Their inquiry, for cautious 
reasons, was careful not to mention very specific measures or disciplines however.   While a 
formal decision on this matter has thus far been blocked, Ecuador has received on-the-record 
assurances from many OECD countries, including the United States, that the GATS safeguards 
leave ample room to maneuver to prevent and mitigate financial crises.9  
While reviews are mixed on the WTO, the literature is more unified that many FTAs and 
BITs may be significantly incompatible with the ability of nations to deploy CARs.  Most FTAs 
and BITs are wider in scope than the WTO.  Whereas the GATS only covers capital transfers 
related to trade in financial services, FTAs and BITs often cover all transfers between parties.  In 
addition, transfers are often broadly defined as any investment, including stocks, bonds, 
currencies, derivatives, direct investment and beyond.  Thus a much broader number of 
investments must be allowed to be transferred ‘freely and without delay’ among parties to an 
agreement. 
 What can often put a developing country at a disadvantage is that when negotiating an 
FTA or a BIT there is a ‘negative list’ approach whereby a nation is expected to liberalize all 
sectors except a handful where they still want to regulate.  Thus if a nation wanted to regulate a 
new financial ‘innovation’ in the future such as a new form of derivative, that nation would not be 
permitted to regulate the related investments because it hadn’t anticipated the innovation and 
reserved the right to regulate during the negotiation.  Of course, such anticipation is impossible as 
financial ‘innovation’ has been at the heard of the globalization of financial volatility. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  WTO,	  (2011).	  S/FIN/M/71,	  Committee	  on	  Trade	  in	  Financial	  Services,	  Report	  of	  the	  meeting	  held	  on	  2	  
November	  2011,	  Note	  by	  the	  Secretariat.	  Available	  at:	  
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/S/FIN/M71.doc	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 What is astonishing is that many FTAs and BITs do not have a balance of payments 
safeguard and/or a prudential carve out.  Those that do have a balance of payments safeguard 
are often modeled after the GATS Article XII and thus have the same concerns described above 
(lack of clear scope for inflows and outflows, a necessity test, and restrictions of temporariness).  
Among the few agreements that have a prudential carve out are those with the United States 
(which generally do not have balance of payments safeguards).  However, most US treaties tie the 
definition of ‘prudential’ more closely to policies pertaining to ‘individual financial institutions’ 
and also include the potentially ‘self-canceling’ language found in the GATS.  Moreover, US 
negotiators have repeatedly stressed that existing language does not pertain to the use of capital 
controls.10  Indeed, a handful of US treaties have annexes that note how capital account 
regulations are deviations from commitments but require an extended ‘cooling off’ period before 
foreign investors may file claims for compensation.  One treaty, the United States-South Korea 
FTA, allows South Korea to deploy regulations as specified under its law as long as such measures 
meet a number of limitations specified in the Annex.   
 The IMF has expressed concern that many FTAs and BITs lack the adequate safeguards to 
put in place CARs:  “The limited flexibility afforded by some bilateral and regional agreements in 
respect to liberalization obligations may create challenges for the management of capital flows” 
(IMF, 2012, 8).  The IMF has developed an institutional view on the use of CARs that defines 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  See	  Saez,	  Raul	  (2006),	  Trade	  in	  Financial	  Services:	  	  The	  Case	  of	  Chile,	  Washington:	  World	  Bank;	  Geithner,	  
Timothy	  (2011),	  Letter	  to	  250	  Economists	  Urging	  The	  US	  to	  Permit	  Capital	  Controls	  within	  US	  Trade	  and	  
Investment	  Treaties.	  http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/policy_research/CapCtrlsLetter.html;	  Taylor,	  John	  
(2003),	  Under	  Secretary	  of	  Treasury	  for	  International	  Affairs	  Testimony	  before	  the	  Subcommittee	  on	  
Domestic	  and	  International	  Monetary	  Policy,	  Trade	  and	  Technology	  Committee	  on	  Financial	  Services	  U.S.	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CARS as “measures affecting cross-border financial activity that discriminate on the basis of 
residency.”  Therefore forbidding nations to violate ‘national treatment’ in treaties may thus 
constrain the ability of nations to use CARS in general and even under IMF advice in particular.  
Some US treaties allow nations to deploy price-based taxation measures on capital flows, or have 
an annex that allows a nation to deploy CARs as long as they meet national treatment 
requirements.  Such limitation may nullify the ability to use CARs by definition.  Moreover, such 
incompatibility may make it more difficult for nations to accept the IMF policy advice based on 
its new institutional view.   
 Finally, there is real concern about the use of ‘investor-state dispute resolution’ in cases 
pertaining to CARs in FTAs and BITs.  WTO disputes are settled ‘state-to-state’ and therefore 
nation states can negotiate on behalf of the well-being of entire nations and financial systems—
looking for situations where the benefits to the majority outweigh losses to a minority.  However, 
that cost-benefit analysis is tipped on its head under investor-state disputes.   Under investor-state 
private firms and investors may directly file claims against governments that regulate capital.  
Therefore, those sectors that may bear the cost have the power to externalize the costs of financial 
instability to the broader public while profiting from awards in private tribunals. 
  
III.  Chile 
In 1990, just returned to democratic rule, Chile faced a greater relative supply of external 
finance than any other Latin American country, owing to its sharp economic recovery, smaller 
economic size and a smooth political transition out of the dictatorship. The new authorities 
considered that a large supply of inflows would be destabilizing for the domestic macroeconomy 
and its export strategy (particularly for the consistency of aggregate demand with potential GDP 
and of the exchange rate with a sustainable external balance). It was alive in the minds of the 
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democratic government the recall of the huge crisis that Chile had suffered in the early 1980s due 
to large capital inflows in the late 1970s, leading to significant exchange rate appreciation, rising 
external deficit and climbing external liabilities.11  
In response to the first signals of increasing inflows, it established an unremunerated 
reserve requirement (URR) of 20% on financial inflows, retained for one quarter. But, the reserve 
requirement rate, the duration for its retention at the Central Bank and its coverage became 
adjustable, according to the strength of the supply of external funds. The purpose was to make net 
flows consistent with the volumes that could be absorbed in productive investment 
(complementing domestic savings) while maintaining macroeconomic equilibrium (an aggregate 
demand consistent with potential output).12 The flexibility with which the rate was managed and 
the extent of its coverage allowed it to posses the virtues of a control mechanism combining the 
use of relative prices and quantitative restrictions (see Table 1). There was a persistent monitoring 
of the market by the Central Bank in order to adjust policy and to close incoming loopholes. In 
parallel, there was implemented a comprehensive managed flexibility of the exchange rate in 
order to achieve a sustainable balance of the current account.13  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Ffrench-­‐Davis,	  Ricardo	  (2010)	  Economic	  Reforms	  in	  Chile:	  From	  Dictatorship	  to	  Democracy,	  Palgrave	  
Macmillan,	  chapter	  III.	  
12	  In	  Ffrench-­‐Davis	  (2010,	  chapter	  VIII)	  there	  is	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  this	  experience	  and	  a	  discussion	  of	  
the	  outcomes.	  See	  	  
Also	  Le	  Fort,	  G.	  and	  S.	  Lehmann	  (2003),	  "	  El	  encaje	  y	  la	  entrada	  neta	  de	  capitales:	  Chile	  en	  el	  decenio	  de	  1990”,	  
Revista	  de	  la	  CEPAL	  No.81,	  December;	  Williamson,	  J.	  (2003),	  “Overview:	  An	  Agenda	  for	  Restarting	  
Growth	   and	   Reform”,	   in	   Kuczynski,	   P.P.	   and	   J.	   Williamson	   (2003),	   eds.,	   After	   the	   Washington	  
Consensus:	  Restarting	  Growth	  and	  Reform	   in	   Latin	  America,	   Institute	   for	   International	   Economics,	  
Washington,	  DC.	  
13	  There	   was	   also	   a	   quite	   responsible	   fiscal	   policy:	   any	   new	   permanent	   expenditure	   was	   	   financed	   by	  	  
corresponding	  tax	  changes;	  in	  1990-­‐98	  there	  was	  	  a	  fiscal	  surplus	  averaging	  2%	  of	  	  GDP.	  It	  must	  
be	  stressed	  that	  a	  fiscal	  surplus	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  	  avoid	  crisis.	  In	  1981	  the	  Chilean	  Treasury	  hold	  a	  
surplus	  	  over	  double	  that	  figure	  and	  	  Chile	  suffered	  the	  tougher	  crisis	  in	  all	  Latin	  America	  in	  1982,	  
with	  a	  14%	  GDP	  drop.	  The	  huge	  macro	  imbalance	  was	  located	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  (See	  Marfán,	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Both policies implied applying several mini adjustments in order to avoid the typical maxi 
adjustments that crisis generate. 
 During 1990-95, Latin America accepted large capital inflows and significant 
appreciation of the exchange rate with rising external deficits; in 1995 suffered the “Tequila 
crisis”, and average GDP growth fell sharply in Mexico, Argentina and Uruguay.The situation in 
Chile was quite different; GDP growth exceeded 7%; exchange rate appreciation and the current 
account deficit (as a share of GDP) were much less than the average for the region. The 
comprehensive disincentives to destabilizing short-term capital inflows provided the room for 
actual counter-cyclical exchange rate and monetary policies along those years. Thus, Chile was 
able to gain control of the composition of inflows, significantly reducing short and liquid short-
term inflows. This, together with interventions to sterilize the monetary and foreign exchange 
markets and prudential regulation of the domestic financial market, avoided a destabilizing 
appreciation of the exchange rate, maintaining, by the mid nineties, an aggregate demand 
consistent with potential GDP and the deficit in the current account within sustainable limits.   
 There is a further dynamic dimension, which links the present with the future; an 
economy with a high rate of productive capacity utilization and long term stable flows, tends to 
exhibit higher productive investment ratios. In fact, even though the private sector was carrying a 
somewhat higher tax burden (a rise from 15% to 18% of GDP) and was now obliged to respect 
more progressive labor rights, the investment ratio increased from 16% of GDP in 1982-89 to 
23% in 1990-98. Real macroeconomic stability was a key determinant of this improvement, 
associated to a level of domestic demand consistent with potential GDP and a “stable and 
competitive” real exchange rate (RER, a crucial macro-price) up to 1995; even though the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
M.	  (2005),	  “La	  eficacia	  de	  la	  política	  fiscal	  y	  los	  déficit	  privados:	  un	  enfoque	  macroeconómico”,	  in	  
J.A.	   Ocampo	   (ed.),	   Más	   allá	   de	   las	   reformas:	   dinámica	   estructural	   y	   vulnerabilidad	  
macroeconómica,	  CEPAL/Alfaomega,	  Bogotá.;	  Ffrench-­‐Davis,	  Economic	  Reforms	  in	  Chile,	  pp.	  
30-­‐31,	  table	  I.4).	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exchange rate policy lost it coherence since 1996, the economy remained using potential GDP 
until 1998.This contributed in Chile to the increasing rate of productive investment during the 
1990s. Actually, Chile achieved a 7% average GDP growth and inequality was somewhat 
reduced, while the average growth of the region was less than half that figure and inequality 
worsened. Instability generated by volatile capital flows is depressive for GDP and regressive for 
its distribution.14 
Paradoxically, since the mid-1990s, Chile (actually, the autonomous Central Bank) 
gradually moved toward the neo-liberal or Washington Consensus approach of capital account 
and exchange rate liberalization. Since it was quite gradual, part of the positive effects of the 
counter-cyclical approach continued to be at work. The economy remained  close to potential 
GDP until 1998, but the deficit on current account started to rise, the exchange rate to appreciate 
significantly and speculative  inflows to increase (though moderately, since the  URR remained in 
place but weakened due to lack of monitoring to fight emerging leakages). Only in 1999  it was 
formally adopted the  so-called “neo-liberal” approach of a fully free exchange rate, followed in 
2001 by a fully open capital account and inflation targeting as a dominant policy target. The 
authorities of the Bank had changed and the staff was receiving new PHDs well trained in the 
belief of the macroeconomic approach led by the flows in an open capital account. Nonetheless, 
with the partial exception of Chile’s treaty with the US, most part of the policy tools remains 
available for the future in case new authorities would decide to apply capital account or exchange 
rate counter-cyclical policies.  
 As a result of the policy reversal, domestic demand and the exchange rate began to 
depend on financial flows, becoming ‘victims’ of the globalization of financial volatility. Inflation 
has been particularly low, but at the expense of the other complementary macroeconomic policy 
targets that had been taken systematically into consideration in the early 1990s: primarily, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Ffrench-­‐Davis,	  Economic	  Reforms	  in	  Chile,	  Chapter	  VIII.	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avoiding unstable aggregate demand and real exchange rate, and persistent output gaps (that is 
unemployment of labor and capital goods) and external imbalances. Actually, the exchange rate 
and domestic demand came to be led by shortermish financial flows, reinforced by terms of trade 
instability, and fell victim to their volatile cycles. Both sustained growth and equity suffered.  
As a consequence, persistently in 1999-2012, the Chilean economy has mostly been out of 
real macroeconomic equilibrium, with significant output gaps, with average actual GDP 
remaining quite below average potential output. As well, an outlier exchange rate has worsened 
trade performance. Since the start of the sharp improvement of the terms of trade in 2004 and the 
parallel surge of financial inflows, a significant  exchange rate appreciation has implied that the 
volume of imports, in 2004-12, has risen at a speed more than doubling that of exports. The gap 
was covered by an evidently abnormally high price of copper.  
 In all, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that capital controls applied rather 
systematically between 1990 and 1995 (i) modified the maturity structure of capital inflows, 
reducing the unstable component; (ii) it allowed the maintenance of a differential between the 
domestic and international interest rates, providing room for an active monetary policy which 
ensured that the economy would ride around the production frontier; (iii) it allowed avoiding a 
destabilizing exchange rate appreciation.15 Above all, (iv) it contributed to a comprehensive and 
sustained real macroeconomic equilibrium that is friendly with growth and equity. Thus, the 
counter-cyclical regulation of the capital account is crucial for building a real macroeconomic 
environment conducive to development. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Magud,	  R.	  and	  C.	  Reinhart	  (2007),	  “Capital	  controls:	  an	  evaluation”,	  in	  S.	  Edwards	  (ed.),	  Capital	  controls	  
and	   capital	   flows	   in	   emerging	   economies:	   policies,	   practices	   and	   consequences,	   University	   of	  
Chicago	  Press,	  Chicago;	  Edwards,	  S.	  and	  R.	  Rigobon	  (2009),	  “Capital	  controls	  on	  inflows,	  exchange	  
rate	  volatility	  and	  external	  vulnerability”,	  Journal	  of	  International	  Economics,	  78.	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Table 1: Capital Account Management in Chile in the 1990s 
Foreign Direct Investment Investments were required to remain in Chile for 
one year and could not be financed with more than 
30 percent debt (70 percent equity).  This was 
reduced from 50 percent in 1997. 
Portfolio Investment Flows In 1994, the minimum ADR issue was reduced 
from $50 million to $25 million.  Non-financial 
firms were required to have a rating of BBB and 
banking firms were required to have a minimum 
rating of BBB+.  Beginning in July 1995, there was 
a 30 percent reserve requirement for secondary 
ADRs.   
Other financial and portfolio inflows Thirty percent reserve requirement on trade 
credits, foreign currency deposits, loans associated 
with FDI, and bond issues.  Bond issuers also faced 
the same restrictions as ADR issuers. 
Foreign Investments of Chilean Institutional 
Investors 
There were limits on the amounts and types of 
foreign assets that could be held by pension funds, 
mutual funds, and life insurance companies.  
Pension funds could hold just 12 percent of their 
total assets in foreign assets, and only half of foreign 
holdings could be stocks. 
Foreign Investments by Banks Foreign financial investments by commercial banks 
were required to be fixed income securities that are 
issued or guaranteed by foreign governments or 
central banks.  These investments were limited to 
25 percent of bank capital and reserves.  Banks 
could use foreign deposits to finance trade among 
countries within the Latin American Association for 
Integration (ALADI).  Commercial banks with a 
capital/asset ratio of at least 10 percent could hold 
equity in foreign banks. 
 
Source:  Ffrench-Davis, Ricardo (2010) ibid, chapter VIII, Box VIII.1. 
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Chile’s WTO Commitments 
Chile has signed onto the GATS but has included numerous horizontal and specific 
limitations that allow it to continue to have policy space to use capital account regulation even 
with its WTO commitments.  It was very conservative in its GATS negotiations.16  The limited 
commitments to capital account liberalization was due in large part to the timing of negotiations.  
Chile’s banking act was being reformed just as negotiations were taking place, so regulators in 
large part were uncertain about the outcome of the legislative process, which prevented them 
from making larger commitments.17  Chile places horizontal limitations on market access and 
national treatment across all of its services obligations.  Measures taken by the Central Bank 
regarding capital inflows and outflows as well as exchange rate policy to maintain financial 
stability are reserved.18 
Chile’s general market access and national treatment limitations specify that for reasons 
of macroeconomic stability and for maintenance of the functioning of the payments system, the 
Chilean Central Bank can adopt measures according to its Banking Act.  This includes limitations 
on payments and transfers in and out of Chile, such as reserve requirements.19  Market access 
limitations state that authorization for commercial presence may take into account the effect of 
the commercial presence on economic activity (including employment and the use of parts, 
products, or services produced within Chile), productivity, industrial efficiency, technological 
development and product innovation in Chile, competition in any sector, consumer protection, 
functioning, integrity, and stability of the market, national interest, and Chile’s integration into 
world markets.  These limitations apply to: corporations, open or closed, private-limited 
companies, and subsidiaries (which under Chilean legislation are the equivalent of agencies of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Saez,	  Raul	  E.	  (2006),	  “Trade	  in	  Financial	  Services:	  The	  Case	  of	  Chile,”	  Free	  Trade	  Agreements	  and	  
Financial	  Services	  in	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  Caribbean	  LCR	  Study,	  December,	  p.	  13.	  
17	  Saez,	  “Trade	  in	  Financial	  Services,”	  p.	  16.	  
18	  Ibid.	  
19	  Ibid.,	  Annex	  1,	  p.	  49.	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corporations).20  These very broad limitations to market access across all services, including 
financial services, allow for considerable leeway for Chilean authorities to limit market access for 
foreign companies.  Chile also maintains significant horizontal limitations for national treatment 
for its liberalization of services.  Its national treatment limitations state that foreign investors may 
transfer capital abroad after the elapse of two years from the date of entry.  
Chile has signed onto GATS financial services; however, it remains unbound and 
maintains multiple limitations beyond those horizontal limitations already discussed.  Cross 
border trade and consumption abroad (modes 1 and 2) are completely unbound except for 
reinsurance and retrocession and brokerage of reinsurance.  Commitments were generally made 
under mode 3, commercial presence, in insurance services.  However, auxiliary insurance 
services, such as consultancy, actuarial, risk, and claim services are not included.  Banking 
regulations essentially follow the guidelines of Chile’s Banking Act; however, not all services in the 
Banking Act are listed in the GATS, for instance, some core banking services.21 
As with Malaysia (and all members of the WTO for that matter), the GATS includes a 
balance of payments exception.  Article XV of the GATT stipulates that nothing within the 
WTO can preclude the use of exchange limitations or exchange regulations that are in 
accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the IMF.  GATS Article XII also specifies that 
prudential measures can be taken to address a balance of payment problem and ensure the 
stability of a member's economy.  However, it is not specified whether capital account regulations, 
particularly regulations on outflows, are considered a measure taken for prudential reasons.22 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Chile	  WTO	  Schedule	  for	  Services,	  accessed	  at	  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_commitments_e.htm,	  6	  May	  2013.	  
21	  Saez,	  “Trade	  in	  Financial	  Services,”	  p.	  14.	  
22 Viterbo, Annamaria (2012) International Economic Law and Monetary Measures: Limits to States' 
Sovereignty and Dispute Settlement, Cheltenham,UK: Elgar International Economic Law, p. 217. 
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While negotiating its GATS obligation in the 1990s, Chile clearly took steps to ensure 
that it could use capital account regulation, including the use of a URR in due time rather than  
already going into a crisis.  Chile chose to take a conservative approach to the GATS and 
remained unbound in several key areas, which allows it to retain this policy space.  In negotiations 
with Canada, the US, and the EU, Chile faced more pressure to liberalize financial services 
and/or take on more commitments. 
 
Canada-Chile FTA 
 The Canada-Chile FTA came into force in July 1997. Canada offered Chile the option of 
negotiating an agreement modeled after NAFTA.23  The FTA contains a chapter on investment 
as well as a chapter on cross-border trade in services.  The financial services chapter was not 
negotiated because Chile felt that it needed to maintain financial services as a bargaining chip for 
later negotiations with the US. 24  It was agreed that a financial services chapter between Chile 
and Canada would begin to be negotiated no later than April 1999; however, this deadline was 
never met.25  Even though the financial services chapter was not included, there were protections 
in the investments chapter intended for investors in foreign financial institutions.26  The 
investment chapter contains both national treatment and most favored nation clauses.  Dispute 
settlement is done through investor-state dispute resolution.    
 Canada expected a strong obligation regarding transfers in and out of the country that 
would prevent the use of an unremunerated reserve requirement (URR).  However, Chile was 
negotiating its agreement with Canada at the same time that the Uruguay round was taking place 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Saez,	  “Trade	  in	  Financial	  Services,”	  pp.	  12-­‐13.	  
24	  Ibid.	  
25	  Ibid.	  
26	  Ibid.,	  p.	  17.	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and it was also creating its banking act, and it did not want to prohibit the use of a URR.  The 
compromise reached was an annex to the investment chapter that provided an exception for 
transfers.  Annex G-09.1 retains Chile’s ability to apply a reserve requirement, but with two 
limitations.  First, the maximum URR is 30% for no more than two years.  Second, there is a 
requirement that authorization of certain transactions that are carried out in the Formal 
Exchange Market be granted without delay.  Additionally, there is a non-discriminatory clause for 
Canadian investors and non-Canadian investors.27 
The Canada FTA has a balance of payments exception that states that “Nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting or maintaining measures that 
restrict transfers where the Party experiences serious balance of payments difficulties, or the threat 
thereof, and such restrictions are consistent with this Article.”28  This exception is modeled after 
GATS.   
Annex G.09.1 and the balance of payments gives Chile the space to implement capital 
account regulation if it needs to.  Chile chose not to negotiate financial services in this FTA which 
allowed it to maintain those negotiations when bargaining directly with the US.  
 
US-Chile Free Trade Agreement 
 The US-Chile FTA entered into force in January 2004.  The agreement includes separate 
chapters on investment, cross-border trade in services, and financial services, all of which are 
relevant for cross-border flows of capital.  The financial services agreement is in large part based 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Ibid.	  
28	   “Canada-­‐Chile	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement,	  Part	  Five,	  Other	  Provisions,	  Chapter	  O,	  Exceptions,”	  accessed	  at	  
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-­‐agreements-­‐accords-­‐commerciaux/agr-­‐acc/chile-­‐chili/chap-­‐
o26.aspx?lang=en&view=d,	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  May	  2013.	  
	   19	  
on the NAFTA financial services agreement.29  Negotiations with the US took place at the same 
time as those with the EU and it was the first time that Chile negotiated about financial services.30   
Financial services are covered specifically in their own chapter, and are only partially 
subject to the requirements of the other services or investment chapters. The financial services 
chapter includes: financial institutions, investors and investments of such investors in financial 
institutions, and cross-border trade of financial services.  A separate negotiating team was 
designated to negotiate issues of capital account regulation and balance-of-payment measures.31  
While the encaje was not in force at the time of negotiation, the Central Bank Act still allowed for 
the imposition of a URR, and the negotiating committee was committed to preserving the right to 
use a URR as well as a balance-of-payments exception.32 
 The financial services chapter has national treatment requirements that apply to both 
Chile and the US for all financial services covered in the chapter.  Article 12.3 of the chapter also 
has most favored nation requirements.  Regarding market access, neither party may impose 
limitations on the number of financial institutions, the total value of financial service transactions, 
the total number of financial service operations, or the total number of natural persons that may 
be employed in a particular financial service.33 
 Throughout the two years of negotiations, the US and Chile were unable to come to 
agreement about capital controls and a balance-of payments exception.  Chile was determined to 
retain the right to use a URR.  The solution that was come to was an annex that allowed Chile to 
adopt measures if needed, but those measures could be subject to dispute settlement by US 
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investors.  However, US investors can file claims no sooner than one year after the measures are 
implemented.  The damages resulting from the measures are also limited to the actual reduction 
in value of transfers, and exclude other damages such as loss of profits.  There are circumstances 
under which claims can immediately be submitted, including transfers related to direct foreign 
investment and payments pursuant to a loan or bond issued in a foreign market.  The exception 
of these investments is intended to distinguish volatile capital flows from other forms of capital 
flows.  The agreement includes no balance-of-payments safeguard provisions.34 
 The compromise reached between the US and Chile leaves somewhat vague the possible 
interpretations of what is permitted under the agreement.  While Chile reserves the right to 
impose capital account regulations to avoid building a crisis and more so during an emergency, 
foreign investors also retain the right to seek compensation after one year.  The compromise was 
the first of its kind in a US FTA, and served as a model for future US FTAs, such as the US-
Singapore agreement.35 
 
Chile-EU Free Trade Agreement 
 In 2002, the EU and Chile concluded an Association Agreement that included a free 
trade agreement.  The stated goal of the agreement is to establish transparent rules for exporters, 
importers, and investors, create a free trade area in goods, services, and government 
procurement, liberalize investment and capital flows, and strengthen the protection of intellectual 
property rights.36   
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EU-style agreements follow a GATS framework where financial services are included as 
an annex to the regular services chapter.  Chile,  as with the US agreement, was able to negotiate 
a separate financial services chapter; however, the chapter still follows a GATS approach with key 
provisions and listing of commitments.37  GATS text was incorporated into the financial services 
chapter without any changes so as to minimize uncertainties associated with legal interpretation, 
which means that market access and national treatment provisions are the same as the GATS.  
There is also a prudential carve-out that is taken from NAFTA and the GATS Annex on 
Financial Services.38  Chile's commitment to liberalizing financial services under the agreement 
remains “intermediate” according to an EU analysis of the agreement.39  No MFN clause is 
included.  There is a schedule of horizontal and specific service commitments made by Chile and 
also by each EU member.   
 The EU agreement contains a chapter on Current Payments and Capital Movements.  
Chile commits to allow payments and transfers in convertible currency in accordance with the 
Articles of Agreement of the IMF.  Chile is obligated to allow the free movement of capital 
relating to investments made in accordance with domestic laws and to allow the repatriation of 
any profit.  However, the chapter contains an article which provides an exception to these 
obligations.  The article states that measures can be taken under “exceptional circumstances, 
payments and capital movements between the Parties cause or threaten to cause serious 
difficulties for the operation of monetary policy or exchange rate policy of either Party.”  In these 
cases, parties can apply safeguard measures for up to one year (and that time period can be 
extended). 40 
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 Beyond its prudential carve-out, the agreement includes Annex XIV that enables the 
Foreign Investment Committee or the government to employ special investment regimes that 
could include minimum periods for the repatriation of capital.  The provision is very similar to 
that in the Canada-Chile FTA, with a condition that measures be applied on a non-
discriminatory basis.  There is also a maximum URR of 30% and a maximum holding period of 
two years.41 
 The prudential carve-out and Annex XIV give a similar degree of freedom to use capital 
account regulation as the GATS and the Canada agreement.  During emergency situations there 
is a greater degree of flexibility to impose capital account regulations, and it appears that Chile 
has retained its ability to use a URR if necessary. 
 
IV.  Malaysia 
 Throughout most of the past thirty years Malaysia has pursued a relatively open 
capital account with few regulations on capital flows.  On two occasions Malaysia decided 
to experiment with extensive capital regulations: once in 1994 and most famously again 
in 1998.  In 1998, it declined IMF funds during the Asian Financial Crisis in order to 
implement capital regulations and expansionary fiscal policy.  Malaysia's policies during 
the crisis are now largely seen as successful.  Since 2000, Malaysia has undertaken 
reforms and re-liberalization of its financial sector.  Table 2 provides an overview of 
regulations used by Malaysia in the 1998 crisis and presently. 
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Table 2: Capital Regulations Implemented by Malaysia 
1998 - One-year ban on outflows 
 - Taxes on outflows (graduated taxes based on length of stay) 
 - Limitations on the transfer of funds in the country from external ringgit 
accounts 
 - Limitations on abilities of foreigners to borrow domestically 
 - Only authorized institutions could handle ringgit financial assets 
 -  All trade transactions required to be settled in foreign currency 
 - Limitations on ability of residents to borrow abroad 
2012 - Limitations on exchanging currency 
 - Limitations on access to ringgit by foreigners 
 - Special requirements for foreign exchange accounts (must be held in Labuan) 
 - Limitations on foreign equity participation and shareholding of financial 
institutions 
 
Source: Gerald Epstein, Ilene Grabel, and K.S. Jomo, “Capital Management Techniques in Developing Countries,” in Jose 
Antonio Ocampo and Joseph Stiglitz, eds., Capital Market Liberalization and Development, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(2008) p. 26-29. 
 
 The regulations implemented during the 1998 crisis were designed to limit foreign 
currency outflows and speculation on the ringgit.  In order to eliminate the offshore 
ringgit market, Malaysia prohibited the transfer of funds into the country from external 
ringgit accounts except for investment or purchase of goods in Malaysia.  Malaysia also 
shut down the offshore market that was operated by the Central Limit Order Book 
(CLOB) in Singapore.  These measures effectively prevented the operation of the offshore 
ringgit market and eliminated a major source of foreign speculation on the currency.    
There was a one-year ban on the outflow of the principle of foreign portfolio 
capital. In order to prevent a sudden outflow at the end of the one-year period, and to 
attract investment from abroad, the government implemented a system of graduated exit 
levies to the profit of foreign portfolio investment.  Larger exit levies were applied to 
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short-term investments.42  In order to make the circulation of ringgit outside of Malaysia 
more difficult, large denomination ringgit notes were demonetized.  Malaysian residents 
needed approval in order to invest abroad.   
 Beginning in 2000, regulations were gradually scaled back after the economy 
stabilized, and by 2007 the regulations were loosened to a level that was more liberal than 
that prior to the Asian Financial Crisis. There are no more controls over the inflow and 
outflow of capital. Non-residents can now borrow any amount in Ringgit for use in the 
real sector within Malaysia. However, limitations are still placed for use of ringgit for 
speculative purposes.  Foreign currency borrowings by Malaysian resident companies and 
individuals have been raised substantially to the equivalent of RM100 million for 
corporate group and RM10 million for individuals. The Ringgit has been partially 
internationalized wherein imports and exports can be invoiced in Ringgit and 
international trade can be settled in Ringgit on-shore.43 Nevertheless, some regulations on 
exchanging ringgit and limiting access to the ringgit for non-residents are still in place in 
order to prevent the growth of another offshore ringgit market.44   
 
WTO Commitments 
 Malaysia has clearly reserved its right to regulate its capital account, as 
demonstrated by the capital account regulations that it continues to use (see Table 1).  It 
has chosen to include some liberalization of financial services under the GATS, which 
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comes with certain obligations for the movement of capital.  Under the GATT there is no 
restriction on capital account regulations; however, if a WTO member chooses to sign on 
to the GATS, the liberalization of certain sectors may require the free flow of capital 
associated with those sectors.  The degree to which the WTO demands the liberalization 
of the capital account depends upon the liberalization of services, particularly financial 
services.45   
 Capital flows are directly referred to in multiple sections of the GATT and 
GATS.  Article XV of the GATT stipulates that nothing within the WTO can preclude 
the use of exchange limitations or exchange regulations that are in accordance with the 
Articles of Agreement of the IMF.  GATS Article XII also specifies that prudential 
measures can be taken to address a balance of payment problem and ensure the stability 
of a member's economy.  However, it is not specified whether capital account regulations, 
particularly regulations on outflows, are considered a measure taken for prudential 
reasons.46 
 The GATS uses a positive-list approach where members specify which sectors 
they will liberalize. Footnote 8 of GATS Article XVI stipulates that if a member commits 
to market access and movement of capital is essential, it must allow the associated 
movement of capital.47   
 Members can place horizontal limitations on market access and national 
treatment in each mode that are in effect across all GATS sectors that are liberalized.  
They can also place horizontal limitations on specific modes within each sector that apply 
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to all sub-sectors.  Lastly, within each sub-sector members can stipulate limitations and 
limitations to each mode.   
 Malaysia places horizontal limitations only on mode three and mode four that 
limit the GATS's national treatment and market access requirements (see Table 3).  In its 
general horizontal limitations for mode three, Malaysia specifies it can impose limitations 
on foreign ownership of companies and businesses.  Under mode three horizontal 
limitations Malaysia also specifies that approval may be denied if dealings in land, 
property, and real estate are for speculative purposes.  Other horizontal limitations 
indicate that incentives can be used for Malaysia-owned firms.  Measures taken for 
national economic or development purposes remain unbound to mode three.48  These 
limitations to national treatment and market access allow Malaysia greater control over 
the ability over foreign service providers setting up branches in Malaysia.    
 
Table 3: Malaysia's Horizontal GATS Exceptions by 2012 
 
Market Access National Treatment 
- Approval is required when a single foreign interest or 
group gains more than 15 percent voting rights in a 
Malaysian company or business, the aggregate foreign 
interest is 30 percent or more (or exceeding 5 million 
ringit), or when the transaction results in foreign 
ownership or control of a Malaysia corporation. 
 
- Approval may be denied if dealings on land, property, 
or real estate are for speculative purposes. 
- Services are unbound for measures  to assist 
development of any Malaysian financial institution to 
achieve objectives of the National Development Policy 
(NDP). 
- Corporation in which the government has an interest 
will give first consideration to service providers in which 
the government also has an interest. 
- Existing or future policies limiting foreign equity or 
interests in companies and businesses in Malaysia shall 
be carried out in a preferential and differentiated 
manner. 
Source: “Horizontal commitments of Malaysia,” World Trade Organization Services Database, accessed at 
http://tsdb.wto.org/simplesearch.aspx, 10 May 2012. 
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 In its financial services sector, Malaysia includes even more limitations on national 
treatment and market access.    Some of the biggest limitations include mode three 
limitations provisions that allow Malaysia to confine offshore banks, investment banks, 
insurance companies, and other companies to the island of Labuan.  These banks are 
permitted to accept foreign currency deposits only. As of 2011, there are 27 foreign banks 
(commercial and Islamic banks) from 14 countries with a presence in Malaysia.49 Pp. 26 
& 92 of Bank Negara (BN), Financial Sector Blueprint, 2011-2020, Aggregate foreign 
shareholding in a commercial bank cannot exceed 30 percent.50 (This has been 
liberalized. Apr 27, 2009 Bank Negara press statement states “In terms of foreign 
shareholding, the new commercial bank may have a foreign equity interest of up to 
100%” and 70% foreign equity interests for Islamic and investment banks). Lending of 
more than 25 million ringgit must be undertaken jointly with a Malaysian commercial or 
merchant bank. 
 Malaysia's commitments essentially bind it to the level of foreign access that it 
provided foreign service providers at the time of the Uruguay WTO negotiations.51  
These limitations on Malaysia's GATS commitments do not reflect Malaysia's current 
liberalization.  By binding its commitments below its actual level of liberalization, 
Malaysia has some flexibility to implement certain capital account regulations.   
 Exceptions and limitations allow greater control of the offshore ringgit market and 
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speculation on real estate.  They also allow for the violation of national treatment in order 
to implement domestic development policies.  Malaysia retains the ability to limit foreign 
market access and require joint ventures.  The GATS limitations allow Malaysia to 
implement many regulations on the lending, borrowing, and trading of domestic and 
foreign currency.52   
 Malaysia’s commitments do, however, preclude it from implementing measures 
such as the ban and tax on outflows during the 1998 crisis.  Malaysia must allow transfers 
and payments for financial services that it has chosen to liberalize, and a ban or tax on 
inflows or outflows would impede transfers and payments. Measures taken in 1998 were 
specifically targeted at foreign investors, and they would violate the national treatment 
discipline of the GATS.  Malaysia would likely only implement these measures during a 
crisis, so it may be able to use the GATS balance of payments exception in order to enact 
temporary capital account regulations.  However, it is not clear if limitations on outflows 
are allowed under the balance of payments clause.  Furthermore, the ban and tax on 
outflows in 1998 was not short-term and therefore would likely not be permissible under 
the balance of payments clause. Were a crisis such as the one in 1998 to arise, Malaysia 
may face less flexibility in its policy options than it did in the 1990s.   
 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) created the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) in 2002 with a goal of regional economic integration by 
2015.  The AEC builds on integration achieved through the Asia Free Trade Agreement 
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(AFTA).  ASEAN members commit to non-binding goals for economic liberalization and 
integration.  Furthermore, the ASEAN Economic Community was created after the 
Asian Financial Crisis.  After the crisis many Asian countries recognized the volatility of 
capital flows and the potential for destabilization.  Thus, while ASEAN commits 
members to liberalization, it also recognized capital account regulation as an important 
tool for developing countries.  This has created somewhat contradictory policy 
recommendations. 
 The AEC was created with the view of creating “free movement of goods, 
services, investment, skilled labor, and freer flow of capital” in the ASEAN region.  The 
AEC charter envisages a single market and production base for ASEAN countries, a 
highly competitive economic region, equitable economic development, and full 
integration in the global economy.53  In 2007, ASEAN leaders adopted the ASEAN 
Economic Blueprint in order to guide the establishment of the AEC by 2015.  According 
to the Blueprint, a single market production will comprise five core elements: (1) free flow 
of goods, (2) free flow of services, (3) free flow of investment, (4) freer flow of capital, and 
(5) free flow of skilled labor.54  The elimination of capital regulations within the ASEAN 
community is part of the integration plan for 2015.55 
 The free flow of capital is also part of a larger ASEAN Capital Market 
Development and Integration Plan.  The ASEAN Capital Market Development and 
Integration Plan seeks to allow more cross-border capital flows, open markets to other 
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ASEAN countries, and create a broader investor base.56  The AEC Blueprint and the 
ASEAN Capital Market Development and Integration Plan both explicitly and implicitly 
commit members to moving toward greater capital market liberalization.  Freer flow of 
capital is called for directly, and the free flow of services, particularly financial services, 
implicitly calls for free flow of capital.   
Within the Blueprint and the Development and Integration Plan, however, are 
special clauses that recognize the use of capital regulations.  In the Blueprint's plan for 
liberalizing service sectors, there is a special clause for financial services that says that 
countries should be able to slowly liberalize their financial sector.57  Financial services 
liberalization also contains flexibilities for certain subsectors.  While the plan still aims at 
liberalizing the financial sector, it also recognizes that capital flows are potentially 
destabilizing and countries may need to liberalize slowly.   
 The Capital Market Development and Integration Plan also recognizes the 
destabilizing potential of capital flows.  It names several guiding principles that should be 
followed in liberalizing capital movements.58  Capital accounts should be liberalized in a 
manner that is consistent with each countries' national agenda and the readiness of the 
economy.  There should also be adequate safeguards against potential macroeconomic 
instability and systemic risk that may arise in the process of liberalization—countries 
should maintain the right to adopt necessary measures to ensure macroeconomic stability.  
Finally, liberalization should be shared by all ASEAN countries.  These guiding principles 
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reflect the attitude of many ASEAN members toward capital flows.  In fact, after the 
Asian Financial Crisis, Asian nations are acutely aware of the potential for destabilization.  
Despite these reservations, however, the Development and Integration plan still aims at 
liberalizing capital movements.  It appears that even though members are concerned 
about destabilization, there is still a general consensus that liberalization of the capital 
account is beneficial for economic growth. 
 As a smaller community that includes many developing countries, ASEAN may 
appear to members as a safer environment to experiment with capital account 
liberalization.  The United States is not a member, and ASEAN countries may be 
inclined to try liberalization within its smaller community.  Liberalization within the 
ASEAN community could have multiple ramifications for the ability of members to use 
capital regulations.  Firstly, capital regulations are inherently imperfect.  Financial agents 
find ways to evade regulations that countries implement.  By liberalizing their capital 
account to the AEC, member countries would create more openings for evading 
regulations.  Financial agents outside of ASEAN could exploit the different level of capital 
market liberalization among ASEAN members in order to evade regulations.   
 Even though there are special clauses to allow for slower liberalization, ASEAN 
commits members to moving toward capital market liberalization.  Liberalization and 
integrated capital markets remains the long-term goal.  There are no binding agreements 
or steps that members must take, however, once a member has made some liberalization 
it may be more difficult to move away from capital account liberalization.  Furthermore, 
members are supposed to work toward a goal of full integration by 2015, so it is possible 
that even stagnation would violate AEC agreements.   
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Japan-Malaysia FTA  
 Malaysia signed an FTA with Japan in 2006.  The agreement covers capital flows 
in both a financial service section and a separate investment chapter.  The services 
agreement contains a commercial presence mode similar to Mode 3 of the GATS.  It uses 
a GATS-style positive-list approach.  The FTA differs from the GATS in that members 
are required to make binding commitments at the current level of liberalization that is in 
force.  Under the GATS, members tend to make binding commitments below the actual 
level of liberalization that is in force, but the Japan-Malaysia FTA requires binding at the 
actual level of liberalization.  Moreover, there is a “ratcheting up” policy where any 
liberalizations that are made in the future become binding.59  The dispute settlement 
mechanism is through ad hoc arbitration and parties can block disputes by failing to 
appoint arbitrators.  Investor-state disputes are allowed specifically for disputes 
concerning the investment chapter.60   
 Malaysia's commitments to Japan in financial services and investment go only 
slightly beyond what it offers through the GATS.  Foreign equity participation limitations 
in some institutions was raised by 5 percent.  The agreement's rules on subsidies and 
domestic regulation for financial services are lenient.  The agreement contains disciplines 
on national treatment, market access, and most favored nation.  The MFN clause 
demands that trade privileges extended to other countries also be extended to Japan and 
Malaysia.    However, there is a carve-out that exempts financial services from other 
obligations of the FTA relating to market access and national treatment.  The carve-out 
states: 
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Notwithstanding any provisions of Chapter 8, a Country shall not be prevented from 
taking measures for prudential reasons, including measures for the protection of investors, 
depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial 
service supplier, or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. Where such 
measures do not conform with the provisions of Chapter 8, they shall not be used as a 
means of avoiding the Country’s commitments or obligations under Chapter 8. 
 
The agreement also contains an emergency safeguard measure (ESM) that allows for 
provisional measures to be taken during a crisis.  The agreement has special rules of 
origin for services.  Each party can deny a service if it establishes that the service is 
provided from or within the territory of another country.  However, there is no specified 
qualification for how the origin of a service provider will be determined.61   
 Malaysia's commitments to Japan allows some flexibility to implement capital 
regulations.  The carve-out for financial services means that Malaysia is not required to 
provide full market access and national treatment for Japanese financial companies.  The 
ESM also allows Malaysia to implement prudential measures during crisis times.  Finally, 
the special rules of origin for services allows Malaysia flexibility to deny service providers 
if they are not fully Japanese.  This helps prevent third countries from accessing 
Malaysia's special rules for Japan.  All of these provide Malaysia with at least equal space 
to implement capital regulations that it has in the GATS.   
 The most significant difference between the GATS commitments and the Japan 
FTA agreement is the binding rules and “ratcheting up” policy.  This difference in 
implementation reduces Malaysia's flexibility and ability to experiment with regulations.  
If Malaysia were to experiment with more liberalization, its commitments are then 
automatically bound to the greater level of openness due to the “ratcheting up” policy in 
the Japan FTA.  In order to return to its original commitment, Malaysia would have to 
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violate its agreement.  This policy most likely deters Malaysia from experimenting with 
different levels of liberalization or capital regulations. 
  
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) 
 The ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) came into 
force in 2010.  AANZFTA has followed a “WTO plus” framework for regulation.  
Regulations minimally follow WTO rules, but may go beyond those rules.  Dispute 
resolution for investment includes investor-state dispute settlement.  Similarly to the 
Malaysia-Japan FTA, AANZFTA binds members to existing levels of market openness.62  
However, there is no automatic “ratcheting up” policy.  The agreement specifies that if a 
market-access commitment is made to a service through the cross-border mode of supply 
and cross-border movement of capital is essential to the service, the country is committed 
to allow the movement of capital.  If a country commits to market access in relation to the 
commercial presence of a service, it must also allow for related transfers of capital into 
that country.  The financial services sector also includes an annex with a prudential 
exception clause that allows for measures to be taken to ensure the stability of the 
economy.63    
 Article 19 of the trade in services chapter discusses safeguard measures.  This 
article recognized the GATS emergency safeguard measures.  However, it requires that 
any measures taken be mutually agreed on by both parties.  The article states that: 
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1. The Parties note the multilateral negotiations pursuant to Article X of GATS on the 
question of emergency safeguard measures based on the principle of non-discrimination. 
Upon the conclusion of such multilateral negotiations, the Parties shall conduct a review 
for the purpose of discussing appropriate amendments to this Agreement so as to 
incorporate the results of such multilateral negotiations. 
2. In the event that the implementation of the commitments made in this Agreement causes 
substantial adverse impact to a service sector of a Party before the conclusion of the 
multilateral negotiations referred to in Paragraph 1, the affected Party may request 
consultations with the other Party or Parties. The requested Party or Parties shall enter into 
consultations with the requesting Party on the commitments that the requested Party or 
Parties consider may have caused substantial adverse impact and on the possibility of the 
requesting Party adopting any measure to alleviate such impact. The requesting Party shall 
notify all the other Parties of their request for consultations under this Paragraph. 
3. Any measures taken pursuant to Paragraph 2 shall be mutually agreed by the Parties 
concerned. 
4. The consulting Parties shall notify the results of the consultations to all other Parties as 
soon as practicable and by no later than the next meeting of the Services Committee 
established pursuant to Article 24 (Committee on Trade in Services) following the 
conclusion of consultations. 64 
 
Members of AANZFTA each develop their own commitments for the investment 
chapter.  Each member will submit their investment chapters by 2015.  The 
commitments will follow a negative-list approach.65  The treaty defines a covered 
investment as “an investment in its territory of an investor of another Party, in existence 
as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement or established, acquired or expanded 
thereafter, and which, where applicable, has been admitted [1] by the host Party, subject 
to its relevant laws, regulations and policies.”66  The investment chapter also includes a 
national treatment clause that states: “Each Party shall accord to investors of another 
Party, and to covered investments, in relation to the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct, operation, liquidation, sale, transfer or other 
disposition of investments, treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like 
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circumstances, to its own investors and their investments.”67 
 Malaysia’s commitments to financial service liberalization is limited and they have 
yet to submit their investment commitments.  There is no single undertaking for 
investment, which means that Malaysia and Vietnam can limit the scope of capital 
account liberalization when they make their commitments.  It remains unbound for many 
of the subsectors that it has made commitments to through the GATS.68  The decision to 
remain unbound to certain subsectors may be due to the policy of binding levels of 
commitment to the actual level of openness.  This binding policy means that Malaysia 
would have to guarantee at a minimum the actual level of openness that was in effect 
when it signed the agreement, which would limit its flexibility to reverse capital market 
liberalization.  It is notable that this agreement was signed only two years after the Global 
Financial Crisis.  Malaysia’s limited commitment to financial services may reflect new 
concerns about capital market liberalization after the crisis.   
 
V.  Summary and Recommendations for the TPP 
This paper pinpoints the commitments made by two TPP countries, Chile and Malaysia 
under the WTO and various FTAs and BITS.  Table 1 summarizes our findings, and reveals that 
both countries have taken steps to preserve their policy space for capital account regulation.  The 
agreements they have entered into, however, have to varying extents limited this space.  As our 
analysis of Chile reveals, the TPP, as proposed by the United States would place significant 
obstacles for the ability of these two nations to regulate cross border finance. 
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Table 1: Comparison of Policy Space for Capital Account Regulation 
 Malaysia Chile  
WTO Limitations on national treatment 
and market access in financial 
services essentially bind Malaysia 
to the level of openness that it 
had during the Uruguay 
negotiations 
Balance of payments exception 
Largely unbound in Modes 1, 2, 
and 4.   
Balance of payments exception  
WTO 
Japan Automatic “ratcheting up” that 
binds Malaysia to its current level 
of current account openness 
Emergency safeguard measures 
(ESM) provisions allowed during 
crisis 
Annex that allows for measures to 
be implemented without foreign 
investors being allowed to litigate 
for one year 




Limited financial service 
liberalization commitments, yet 
to submit investment chapter 
Remains unbound for many 
subsectors 
Agreement contains a binding 
policy, which requires a 
minimum degree of openness for 
any bound sectors 
GATS-style balance of payments 
exception 
GATS-style balance of payments 
exception 
Annex G.09.1 allows a maximum 
URR of 30% for up to two years 
Canada 
ASEAN No binding commitments 
All members commit to move 
toward greater liberalization 
Goal of full economic integration 
among members by 2015 
Advocates that countries retain 
their right for emergency 
safeguard measures 
Capital account regulation 
measures can be taken “under 
exceptional circumstances” 
according to one article of the 
chapter on the free movement of 
capital 
Annex XIV allows a maximum 
URR of 30% for up to two years 
EU 
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For Malaysia, the agreement that most infringes on its policy space is that with Japan.  
The “ratcheting up” policy of the Japan agreement automatically binds Malaysia to the existing 
state of openness and limits Malaysia’s ability to experiment with various degrees of openness.  
However, this agreement still contains a balance of payments exception for emergency measures.   
Chile’s agreement with the United States is its most limiting agreement.  Chile can 
implement a URR under the agreement; however, foreign investors can claim damages   from 
measures that Chile implements.  Furthermore, there is no balance of payments exception.  This 
is the only agreement examined in this paper that does not include a balance of payments 
exception.  This means that even in a crisis situation, Chile could face litigation from investors 
(after a one-year “cooling off” period).Both Malaysia and Chile have made compromises to their 
policy space in negotiating free trade agreements; however, they have so far in large part retained 
the ability to implement measures in times leading  to  or of financial crisis.  There may be 
consequences to implementing such measures, particularly for Chile due to the lack of balance of 
payments exception.   
In the TPP the United States has proposed provisions that offer even less than what Chile 
received in the US-Chile FTA—a wide definition of investment with no balance of payments 
provisions and no change in the prudential exception. In fact, is trying to  get what was unable in 
the negotiations of the Chile-US FTA. However, according to leaked text of the investment 
chapter, TPP negotiating partners have introduced two additions.  Analagous to what it 
negotiated with Canada and the EU, Chile has proposed an annex to the agreement that would 
give deference to Chile’s encaje law.  One other nation has proposed a balance of payments 
exception quite similar to the one in the GATS.  This pair of reforms would be more consistent 
with current thinking on these issues but would not go far enough for Malaysia and other parties 
to the TPP. 
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For Chile, deference to its law and a balance of payments provision would grant Chile the 
ability to regulate both the inflow and outflow of capital to prevent and mitigate financial 
instability.  Malaysia would have the policy space to regulate outflows of capital in the middle of a 
crisis under a balance of payments exception.  However, Malaysia and other TPP nations do not 
have an encaje on their books and thus would not benefit from a special annex for Chile.  In 
order for TPP nations to have ample space to regulate the inflow of capital there would have to be 
a deletion of the footnote that constrains the definition of “prudential”.  It could be replaced with 
a footnote that has an illustrative but not exhaustive list of measures such as capital account 
regulations.  Only then can TPP nations rest assure that they have all the tools necessary to 
regulate capital flows for development. 
 
 
